|
|
Syria, the United States, and the War on Terror in the
Middle East. (Book review). Carsten Wieland. Robert Rabil's latest book is much more than an overview of US-Syrian relations. It sketches the most important developments in the Levant and its surroundings from the middle of the 20th century up to today. Thus the book also deals with Israel, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. Nevertheless, Rabil keeps a clear, systematic focus on the complex linkages between regional developments and Syria's foreign policy. The book starts out with a background discussion of Syrian collective consciousness, i.e., Syria's nationalist struggle for independence and the emergence of modern Syria under the Ba'thist regime and Hafiz al-Asad. Subsequently, the author explores US-Syrian relations during the Cold War and throughout the Israeli-Palestinian confrontations. Further chapters tackle the bilateral relations during the peace process (1991-2000) and after 9/11. Rabil analyzes the factors that have contributed to the collision course between the US and Syria. Two chapters scrutinize the Lebanese scenario, in which Syria finally lost important leverage in the region and which reshuffled the stakes in Damascus' domestic theatre. The book concludes with Syrian and US policy options. One of Rabil's original observations is that Syria's current foreign policy rhetoric is based to a growing extent on the claim of a "clash of civilizations." One of the most eloquent champions of this view is Syrian Minister of Expatriates, Buthaina Shaaban. She points out that Western anti-Semitism is taking a new form, i.e., anti-Arabism, which manifests itself by unsanctioned Israeli killings of Palestinian civilians and US soldiers' torturing of Iraqi prisoners. Shaaban is convinced that this treatment stems from a racist, condescending view of Arabs. Thus protecting Arabism becomes synonymous with protecting the sole champion of this cause left: Syria and its regime. Even the Syrian opposition is stuck between their demands for more sweeping reforms and their nationalist stance. Earlier, Hafiz al-Asad, unlike Saddam Husayn, had subordinated pan-Arab nationalism, and thus the Palestinian question, to the Syrian raison d'etat. In his foreign policy he violated Ba'thist principles in various instances. Now ironically, after the destruction of Iraqi Ba'thism, Syria is in the position of being the sole pan-Arab mouthpiece. President Bashar al-Asad has exploited this unexpected role to build support and sympathy far beyond public opinion in Syria. By choosing this ideological path he gambled high and burnt the bridges to Washington. As the author points out, US-Syrian relations have experienced many ups and downs. After World War II, the US had an equally good relationship with Syria as with Israel. The rivalry began with the Cold War and the Arab nationalist perception of Israel as a colonial entity. The turning point came in 1967, when the US crystallized as Israel's most faithful ally and the Soviet Union became the main arms supplier for Syria and Egypt. In the mid-1970s, after US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had mediated the disengagement plan on the Golan Heights, the atmosphere between the United States and Syria became friendlier again. In 1975, Syria's foreign minister 'Abdul Halim Khaddam even was received at the White House, and the United States granted loans and aid to Syria. The Ford and Carter administrations were the champions of this approach, which gave Washington leverage to influence both sides of the conflict. This changed when Syria appeared on the US State Department's "terrorism list" in 1979, leading to economic sanctions. But US policymakers believed that Syria played a pivotal role in the region. This led to an ambivalent US attitude toward Syria. As Rabil shows, whereas the US Executive branch often sympathized with Syria, Congress tended to pass laws to punish Syria. Terrorism drove the countries apart and at the same time brought them together: Syria helped the US to broker several deals to free US hostages from Lebanese Shi'a and Palestinian terrorists in the 1980s and early 1990s. The US terrorism reports of the mid-1990s found Syria innocent of terrorism and a moderating force on Palestinian organizations and Hizbullah, although they stated that Syria allowed Iran to deliver arms to Hizbullah. In 2002, the US State Department conceded that Syria was not directly involved in international terrorist attacks since 1986. But Congress remained unimpressed as long as Syria harbored Palestinian organizations on its soil. The relationship remained contradictory: "[...] inasmuch as the United States wanted to punish Syria for its involvement in terrorism, the United States needed Syria's help in dealing with terrorism," writes Rabil (p. 77). This continued after 9/11, when Syrian intelligence shared valuable information about al-Qa'ida members and helped to save American lives. Rabil notes an interesting shift in the US' definition of terrorism. In 1990, US Secretary of State James Baker shared Syria's notion. Accordingly, any acts of violence outside the Israeli occupied territories were considered terrorism, whereas acts of violence within these territories were considered resistance to Israeli occupation. By contrast, President George W. Bush's Administration has adopted Israel's definition, especially after 9/11, which does not make this distinction. This prevented Syria--an experienced and staunch fighter against Islamist terrorism--from profiting from 9/11 as a pro-American anti-terrorist protagonist like, for example, President Pervez Musharraf did despite Pakistan's ambivalent record in this respect. After the death of Hafiz al-Asad, the 9/ 11 attacks, and Syria's staunch opposition to the Iraq war the dynamics of US-Syrian relations changed considerably and Syria became part of the extended "axis of evil." Rabil writes: "Ironically, where the senior al-Asad had sacrificed Arab nationalism at the altar of Syria's national interest in general and regime security in particular, the Syrian leadership today has been advancing Arab nationalism with the objective of countering US plans in the region" (p. 135). Rabil far-sightedly points out that Syria's weak point will turn out to be Lebanon. He describes the fatal mistakes of the Syrian regime in late 2004. This culminated in the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and the withdrawal of Syrian troops after almost 30 years of occupation. Thus Syria fulfilled part of the France and US-sponsored UN Resolution 1559 that had become the main tool to clip Syria's wings. Only a minority in the US intelligence establishment warned against a vacuum in Lebanon that would unleash Islamist terrorist forces and leave behind Hizbullah unrestrained. Against the background of the Israel-Hizbullah war of July 2006, Rabil's book reads as a good preparation to understand the present dynamics. However, the author's optimism with regard to Lebanon's domestic political development seems a bit overstretched in light of the new events. The envisaged US model of democracy in the Middle East may have to go through the tough or almost suicidal process of disarming Hizbullah under aggravated circumstances. This conflict, however, could bring Syria back into the limelight. After having kicked Syria out of Lebanon, Western states could reach out to Syria to play a constructive role in defusing tensions there. This leads to yet another well-taken conclusion in Rabil's book: The future of the region and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process depend a lot on how Washington and Damascus deal with each other. Rabil holds that "Washington needs to articulate a Syrian strategy" (p. 198). He speaks of a "dying regime" in Damascus but also warns against a "miscalculated or hubris-laden" campaign against Syria, which could lead to anarchy in the country and promote a new fertile ground for terrorism. This would once more torpedo Washington's anti-terrorism agenda in the Middle East. Rabil has written a dispassionate and scrupulously researched account of the Middle Eastern dynamics that lie at the center of today's most urgent challenges. Unlike other books that have been written about Syria and US foreign policy, this work stands out in its in-depth treatment of ideological and socio-political conditions in the region. To his credit, Rabil does not view the Levant simply through the lens of US policy; consequently, the title of the book is narrower than the author's actual perspective. Dr. Carsten Wieland, Research Fellow at Georgetown University, is the author of Syria--Ballots or Bullets? Democracy, Islamism and Secularism in the Levant (Curie Press, 2006). Although Rabil completed this book in March 2005, he was prescient in
analyzing the politics of Syria, Lebanon, and Hezbollah. Rabil suggested
conditions could lead to war, which did occur in July-August 2006. He cites
reasons for the US government's growing frustration with Syria's support for
resistance forces in Iraq, Hamas, and Islamic jihad. Rabil contends the Asad
regime's policy of liberalizing the economy is accompanied by even more
authoritarian measures to contain dissent. One such policy is to encourage
Pan-Arabism as well as Islamist ideologies. The assassination of former Lebanese
Prime Minister Refik Hariri in 2005, which resulted in a popular revolt
compelling the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon, encouraged the author
to think that Lebanon might yet be able to foster a viable Lebanese state. But
the war between Hezbollah and Israel jeopardized this possibility. Indeed, the
war may well result in another prediction of the author's coming true: "Syria is
set to clash with the United States over the future of the Middle
East."...Highly recommended. Upper-division undergraduates through
practitioners. Rabil has written a dispassionate and scrupulously researched account of the
Middle Eastern dynamics that stand at the centre of today's most urgent
challenges. Unlike other books that have been written about Syria and US foreign
policy, this work stands out in its in-depth treatment of ideological and
socio-political realities in the region. [M]uch more than an overview of United States-Syrian relations. It sketches the
most important developments in the Levant and its surroundings from the mid-20th
century to today. Thus it also deals with Israel, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, and
Iran, while keeping a clear and systematic focus on how their complex
interconnections link to Syria's foreign policy....Against the background of the
Israel-Hizbollah war of July 2006, Rabil's book is ideally placed to aid
understanding of the latest dynamics....[a] dispassionate and scrupulously
researched account of middle-eastern political dynamics. Those who have made or
might consider a trip to Syria and the region could benefit from reading it.
|
|
This book deals with the fabric of relations between Israel, Syria, and Lebanon, three neighboring countries whose destiny has been combined ever since they emerged as independent states and even before that. Their joint history is a history of conflict and struggle. The book focuses on this conflict, its roots and its development along the years. At the same time, it gives special emphasis to the futile efforts during the 1990s to bring this conflict to an end. The last part of the book thus raises the question of why the three states failed to overcome the difficulties and bridge the wide gap of hostility and animosity that separated them. Rabil's decision to start his book with this quote is not accidental and does reflect one of the main and central arguments of his research. Indeed, according to Rabil the Israeli-Syrian-Lebanese conflict should be looked at as a deep and ideological conflict with historical background that should not be ignored. It is not merely a conflict between two states, but one between two ideological concepts. After all, Syria emerged from Arabism and still considered itself Arab before being Syrian. This is an important and significant argument especially against the background of the arguments that were heard often after the collapse of the Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations in early 2000, according to which this collapse was a result of a disagreement about a small piece of land of about ten meters along the northern part of the shore of the Sea of Galilee. In Rabil's eyes this is to ignore the essence of the conflict and its deep roots and diversity of dimensions. The last part of the book focuses on the futile efforts to achieve peace between Israel, Syria, and Lebanon during the 1990s. This is an accurate, full, and updated account of a kind that has not been written before. It is also an account that deals with the substance and raises the right questions. Rabil's main argument is that a peace agreement was not achieved between the sides not because of disagreements about this or that technical detail, but because of the lack of readiness or ripeness in the two sides to make the jump, not to say the mental jump, that was needed for peace against the background of the depth of the conflict. The blame for this failure belongs to all sides: the leaders, the governments but also the publics, the Israeli as well as the Syrian public. The Israeli public refused to accept the idea of territorial withdrawals and to give up the territorial achievements that Israel gained in the Golan Heights during the Six Day war, while the Syrian public refused to accept that time had come to end the historical conflict with Israel. There is no doubt that Rabil's deep understanding of the dimensions of the conflict is due to his deep knowledge of the history of conflict from its early beginning. There is no doubt that the book is detailed and draws for the reader a full picture of the relations between the different states based on a close examination of each of them—their structures, the ideological concepts that ruled and influenced in each of the countries, and, finally, the conduct of the different regimes through the years. A useful feature of the book is that alongside its discussion of the bilateral relations it explores the internal dynamics of each of the states. It is worthwhile mentioning that apart from being deep and well rooted and full of facts the book can be read easily and flows. In writing a book about a conflict it is easy to take sides, showing empathy and even sympathy for one of the contenders. This writer, to his credit, does not fall into this trap. The book brings us an honest and full account and objective presentation of the narratives of the two sides, which may well anger both of them. The list of Lebanese and the Syrian sources is impressive. This book is obligatory for everybody interested in Israel's relations with its northern neighbors. It would especially be mandatory reading for the negotiation teams of all sides if and when the peace process is resumed. The book starts with a quote from a book written in 1905 by one of the founders and the first thinkers of the Arab national movement, Najib Azory. The quote deals with the unavoidable conflict, according to the writer, between Jews and Arabs in Palestine that might even spread all over the entire region. In his book Le Reveil de la Nation Arabe dans l'Asie Turque, which should be considered as a prophecy, Azory writes: "Two important phenomena, of the same nature but opposed, are emerging at this moment in Asiatic Turkey. They are the awakening of the Arab nation and the latent effort of the Jews to reconstitute on a very large scale the ancient kingdom of Israel. These two movements are destined to confront each other continuously, until one prevails over the other. The final outcome of this struggle, between two peoples that represent two contradictory principles, may shape the destiny of the whole world."
|
|
|
 |
 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
© Copyright 2007. Robert. G. Rabil
Design by Michael Toumayan